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On December 3, 2010, the United States and South Korea 
agreed to incremental changes to the Korea-US Free Trade 
Agreement  (KORUS  FTA)  that  was  signed  in  June  2007 
but not ratified by the US Congress or the Korean National 
Assembly. Most of the changes affect bilateral trade in autos 
and light trucks; other minor changes involve pharmaceutical 
patents, US pork exports, and US visas.
In economic terms, the overall impact of the new deal 
differs little from the old deal. Changes in the tariff schedules 
reduce the overall benefits of the trade pact but not by very 
much. Immediate tariff cuts on autos and light trucks have 
been deferred a few years, but changes in Korea’s regulatory 
policies and procedures on autos should help mitigate existing 
problems  and  preclude  the  introduction  of  new  nontariff  
barriers to US exports to Korea. 
In political terms, the new deal is far superior because it 
has elicited new support from US industry and two important 
labor unions that greatly increases prospects for Congressional 
ratification.  If  the  KORUS  FTA  is  approved  by  Congress 
in the first half of 2011, the pact could enter into force by 
January 1, 2012. 
The AuTo PAckAge
The new agreement slows down tariff liberalization and speeds 
up regulatory reforms affecting auto emissions, fuel economy, 
and safety standards. It also establishes a new auto-specific 
safeguard procedure that can be invoked by either country in 
the event of harmful import surges. 
Under  the  new  agreement  the  US  car  tariff,  currently   
2.5  percent,  will  be  maintained  for  four  years  (i.e.,  until 
January 2016) and then eliminated. In turn, Korea slowed its 
own tariff reform. Instead of being eliminated immediately, the 
8 percent Korean car tariff will be reduced to 4 percent upon 
entry into force of the pact and then eliminated at the same 
time as the US car tariff. Note that Korea agreed in its FTA 
with the European Union to phase out its tariff on large engine 
cars within three years; thus, if the KORUS FTA enters into 
force on January 1, 2012, US car exporters will have a small 
tariff  advantage  over  European  exporters  (4  percent  versus   
5.3 percent) in the first year and then will face a small disadvan-
tage until January 2016. The exception to this general pattern 
is electric cars and plug-in hybrids; instead of a 10-year tariff 
phase-out, tariffs on these vehicles will now be phased out in 
five years.
In  addition,  the  US  tariff  on  light  trucks,  which  has 
been 25 percent since the infamous 1963 US-Europe chicken 
war, will be maintained for seven years (until 2019) and then 
phased out over the next three years. Originally, the light truck 
tariff was to be phased out in 10 equal annual increments. In 
this case, however, Korea did not slow its own tariff reform; 
the 10 percent Korean truck tariff will be eliminated upon 
entry into force of the agreement.
Do these changes in tariff reforms make much of a differ-
ence? Probably not—and definitely not if the Doha Round 
agreement concludes and begins to cut most-favored nation 
(MFN) tariffs starting in January 2013, the likely start date 
if a WTO deal is reached by early 2012. In that case, the US 
car tariff would decline from 2.5 percent to 1.9 percent in six 
annual increments of 0.1 percent starting in January 2014. 
Similarly, US light truck tariffs would be phased down from 
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US MFN tariff would be lower than the KORUS preferential 
tariff beginning in January 2014.
The more valuable changes in the auto provisions involve 
Korean regulatory policies. Three commitments bear mention. 
First, Korea agreed that US imports would comply with fuel 
economy and emissions standards if the cars do not exceed 
119 percent of current Korean emissions limits. This “leniency 
rate” applies to each US manufacturer that sold no more than 
4,500 units in the 2009 base year; it thus covers GM, Ford, 
and Chrysler. As a practical matter, emissions standards are 
being upgraded in each country. Korea’s fuel efficiency stan-
dard will require automakers to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions to 140 grams per kilometer and improve fuel economy 
to 17 kilometers per liter by 2015, which translates into an 
effective  standard  of  40  miles  per  gallon.  By  contrast,  the 
United States will require automakers to achieve 36 miles per 
gallon by 2016. These standards are for fleet averages. The new 
agreement recognizes that cars imported into Korea generally 
are larger and less fuel efficient than the subcompact vehicles 
that dominate Korean domestic car sales and that fleet aver-
aging requirements favor Korean producers. The leniency rate 
effectively remedies that discrimination until the new regula-
tions are fully implemented in 2015. 
Second, Korea agreed to recognize and/or accept US safety 
regulations for imported US cars if the number imported does 
not exceed 25,000 vehicles per automaker. This limit has been 
increased from 6,500 units in the original pact. Since annual 
US exports to Korea from all companies have averaged 5,000 
to 7,000 cars, this new regulation effectively grants mutual 
recognition to US standards even if US shipments from each 
automaker  increase  fourfold.  This  provision  should  fully 
accommodate the likely growth in US car exports for the fore-
seeable future.
Third, Korea committed to making its regulatory process 
more transparent to ensure that new regulations do not create 
unnecessary barriers to trade. In addition, Korea agreed to give 
auto companies 12 months to comply with significant regula-
tory changes before new requirements become effective.
Finally,  the  new  accord  creates  special  auto  safeguard 
provisions, which allow the United States or Korea to impose 
temporary protection to counter import surges. This new auto 
safeguard  supplements  the  general  safeguards  provisions  in 
the KORUS FTA, which expire 10 years after the entry into 
force of the agreement. The special auto provision allows each 
country to impose safeguard measures “for 10 years beyond 
the full elimination of tariffs for each Korean auto product” 
(White House 2010). In other words, until January 2026 for 
cars and January 2032 for light trucks. It is highly unlikely 
that this mechanism would be used, however, since Korean 
automakers already are sourcing a greater share of their US 
sales  from  US-based  assembly  plants.  Nonetheless,  the  US 
auto  industry  regards  these  provisions  as  insurance  against 
market  disruption;  the  Koreans  agreed  since  the  insurance 
premium is minimal.
oTher chAnges
Trade negotiations are an exercise in “give and take,” so it 
was  not  surprising  that  Korean  officials  sought  changes  in 
the KORUS FTA to compensate for the new auto provisions 
demanded by US officials. In addition to the short delay in 
cutting Korean car tariffs, three changes were chalked up on 
the Korean side of the ledger. Here again the changes have 
scant impact on bilateral trade. 
First, the 25 percent Korean tariff on imports of a major 
category of US frozen pork will be phased out by January 2016 
instead of January 2014. Despite the delay, US pork producers 
still come out well ahead as a result of the agreement. 
Second, the applicability of US L-1 visas for intracom-
pany transfers of Korean professionals working in the United 
States will be extended to five years. Currently L-1 visas are 
valid  for  either  one  or  three  years  (with  the  possibility  of 
extensions),  depending  on  whether  the  worker  is  with  an 
established Korean subsidiary in the United States or is setting 
up a new office (Inside US Trade 2010, p. 14). 
Third, the United States agreed to extend the grace period 
before  Korea  has  to  implement  a  pharmaceutical  “patent 
linkage”  system  under  which  regulators  investigate  patent 
infringement claims before granting marketing approval for 
generic drugs. The KORUS FTA obligations in this area were 
maintained  but  Korea  was  given  three  years  instead  of  18 
months to adopt a patent linkage regime.
The BoTTom Line
On balance, KORUS FTA 2.0 is almost as good as the original, 
and some provisions are notable improvements. The original 
deal should have been ratified years ago but faced significant 
resistance  primarily  from  Ford,  Chrysler,  the  United  Auto 
Workers,  and  their  congressional  representatives.  President 
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Obama  accepted  much  of  their  critique  and  committed 
to  “level  the  playing  field  for  US  auto  manufacturers  and 
workers” (White House 2010). 
Most of the auto changes focus on protecting the US 
market from imported automobiles for a few extra years. What 
this likely means for US companies and workers is less pres-
sure from Korean imports and more competition from Korean 
cars produced in US plants. The new pact also rectifies several 
problems regarding Korean regulatory policies that had not 
been fully remedied in the original agreement. Combining the 
regulatory reforms and the Korean tariff cuts, US exporters 
should be able to sell more cars to Korea—though they will 
no longer benefit from immediate elimination of the Korean 
car tariff and they will now face tougher competition from 
European firms benefiting from the EU-Korea FTA starting 
in July 2011. 
The agreement should also have positive 
knock-on effects on the awakening 
global trade talks and on negotiations 
for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Like  most  political  compromises,  the  new  trade  pact 
took two steps forward and one step back. Overall, however, 
the KORUS FTA still provides big net gains for both sides. 
US-Korean trade in goods and services should expand signifi-
cantly. The US International Trade Commission estimated in 
2007 that the KORUS FTA would increase annual bilateral 
trade by more than $20 billion—and the new provisions should 
not diminish that positive outlook. The agreement should also 
have positive knock-on effects on the awakening global trade 
talks and on negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (which 
Korea may now consider joining later next year). And perhaps 
most importantly, the deal helps reconfirm and reinforce the 
strategic alliance between the United States and Korea that has 
been a crucial part of our bilateral relations for the past 60 years. 
While the fits and starts of the negotiating process were messy, if 
the new deal leads to Congressional ratification next summer, as 
is now expected, then it will be well worth the effort. 
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